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The first centenary (1900-2000) of the establishment of agricultural coop-
eratives in the Greek countryside is an appropriate occasion for offering a 
critical retrospective of their operations during the 20
th century. Initially, 
the causes of their delayed appearance and establishment in Greece are in-
vestigated. Subsequently, the large extension of agricultural credit, as well 
as the constantly increasing involvement of the government and banks in 
their internal affairs are described and analyzed. This analysis also focuses 
on the particular interwar conditions that favored the protectionism of the 
agricultural economy and the “State’s supervision” of cooperatives, an es-
sential element of agrarian policy, even during the first post-war period. 
Finally, we examine developments relating to the cooperatives during the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy, namely, the subsequent legisla-
tive interference, doubtful investments, as well as the transformation of the 
organizations into an arena of self-interest for political parties and their 
leaders and into a means of implementing government social policy. 
Introduction: The delayed appearance of cooperatives in Greece.  
From Almyros to Law 602/1914 
November 2000 marked one century of the Greek agricultural cooperatives’ presence 
in the economic and social life of Greece. On November 12
th 1900, the first agricul-
tural “cooperative” was established in the village of Almyros in Volos, named the 
Mutual Shareholders’ Agricultural Fund, in the form of an association, as legislation 
regarding the formation of cooperatives was non-existent at the time. Although its 
foundation came much later than that of cooperatives in other European countries, it 
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signaled the beginning of agricultural cooperatives in rural Greece. In fact, as was 
proved later, these institutions constituted an important means of coordination of 
agricultural production as well as a tool of external intervention and promotion of 
governmental agricultural policy. 
The late appearance of cooperatives in Greece (by the standards not only of 
Europe but also of the Balkans) is associated with the delayed capitalistic develop-
ment in the agricultural sector, as well as the particular form of social structures at 
the time and the representation of agricultural interests. Agricultural reform in 
Greece was a long, drawn-out process, which lasted almost a century (1830-1922) 
and was substantially influenced by the continual annexation of territories. Conse-
quently, Greek agricultural reform was delayed and was essentially completed during 
the 1930s. This determined the content of farmers’ demands and claims in the 19
th 
century and principles in the 20
th, typically placing emphasis on the pressing question 
of land distribution to tenant farmers and assigning much less importance to coopera-
tive organization. 
Another factor of the delayed cooperatives development in Greece was the “indi-
rect” means of representation of agricultural interests and demands in the country. In 
other words, this representation was not effected directly through any farmers’ or-
ganization (non-existent at the time) but mainly through the incorporation of the 
agricultural sector into the central institutions of the bourgeois government (Sakella-
ropoulos, 1991). In this way, the representation and organization of their interests 
were not the result of an organized, agricultural, cooperative movement, but of po-
litical power aimed at agricultural alignment with government policies. This process 
was intensified by the non-existence of any organized agricultural movement, which 
could have promoted its own demands and priorities. The sporadic rural revolts, ei-
ther in the regions of small landowners in Old Greece or in the areas of large 
landowners after the annexation of Thessaly (1881), were rather the exception to the 
rule. Moreover, the very foundation and survival of the cooperative of Almyros was 
not the result of any organized agricultural action (which at that time had as its main 
goal the distribution of land to tenant farmers) but mainly the work of the intellectu-
als Grigoriadis and Mixopoulos and later Iasemidis.
1 Very few in the rest of Greece 
followed the example of Almyros and no other attempts at founding cooperatives in 
the 1909-1911 enjoyed lasting success.
2 Thus, on the eve of State intervention in 
cooperative operations with the enactment of Law 602/1914, rural Greece did not 
have a powerful and extensive cooperative network which could have influenced the 
ensuing developments in the agricultural sector. 
                                                        
1  Functioning as an “active minority” (Charalambous, 1993:87), these intellectuals needed only to 
“catechize” the rural population and encourage them with their decisiveness to resolve their uncertain-
ties. The survival and continued operation of the Almyros cooperative seems exclusively to be due to 
their persistence and courage (Koliou, 1996:101-102). 
2  Iasemidis noted in 1909: “It was, unfortunately, in Greece the sole example of an agricultural co-
operative at a time when in Rumania there were 100, in Bulgaria approximately 90 and in Serbia roughly 
150, not to mention the 10,500 in Germany and nearly 700 in Italy” (Koliou, 1996:120).      Agricultural Cooperative Organizations in Greece  53 
 
Cooperatives in Greece emerged not as a mature demand of farmers but as an ex-
pression of the government’s desire to create new means for facilitating 
implementation of agricultural policies. At the end of 1914 this desire was expressed 
in the proposed bill (which was to become Law 602) put forward by the Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Finance, A. Mylonas, and his colleagues belonging to A. 
Papanastasiou’s “Sociologists” group. This initiative was a part of the more general 
spirit of “bourgeois modernization” (Mavrogordatos, 1992:9-11), that is to say, of a 
wider context of basic intervention and change which dominated Greek society at 
this time, induced by the important developments in national and international af-
fairs, as well as the annexation of new territory. This conception marked a new 
direction for the Greek farmers, which emphasized the insufficiencies in traditional 
agricultural policies and the need to extend credit to the majority of the rural popula-
tion in such a way as to ensure the interests of the banks. The enactment of Law 
602/1914 filled this gap and was finally imposed “from above” on Greek coopera-
tives, constituting a characteristic example of an externally imposed institution in the 
agricultural economy. 
This study, moreover, pursues a critical approach regarding the operation of 
Greek agricultural cooperatives after their establishment with Law 602/1914. It par-
ticularly examines the definitive role of the government and the banks in their 
development during the interwar years, as well as the first post-war period. In addi-
tion, it examines the evolution of cooperatives after the fall of the dictatorship (1974) 
and their entanglement with the State and political parties, a factor which strongly 
determines their current operation. 
Agricultural cooperatives in the interwar period (1915-1940) 
The development of agricultural cooperatives in the interwar years is related to the 
rapid changes, for the better, in agricultural conditions taking place at that time.
3 
Under such conditions the enactment of Law 602/1914 led to impressive coordinated 
development of agricultural cooperatives and agricultural credit in the whole of rural 
Greece; 4,150 cooperatives were founded up to 1926, belonging to 39 provincial 
cooperative unions and representing nearly 270,000 farmers (Avdelidis, 1976:60-61). 
This increase created an extensive network for the promotion of the government’s 
agrarian policies and a basic mechanism for limiting usury and expanding credit 
                                                        
3  Radical agricultural reforms, the settlement of refugees in rural areas, the establishment of the Min-
istry of Agriculture in 1917 with subsequent proliferation of autonomous agricultural organizations, the 
extension of subsidies by the National Bank of Greece to the rural population after 1915, the founding of 
the Agricultural Bank in 1929, the draining, irrigation and reclamation works initiated in the countryside, 
the policy of “self-sufficiency,” the increase in cultivation of exportable crops (tobacco and cotton) at 
the expense of “traditional products”: these are some basic features of the period in question, when by 
means of subsidies and price reductions on inputs the government injected funds into the agricultural 
sector. 54  V. Patronis and K. Mavreas 
 
availability, as well as providing basic inputs at a low cost (fertilizers, pesticides and 
selected seeds). 
Also, according to the provision of Law 602/1914, agricultural cooperatives acted 
as guarantors for loans granted by the National Bank of Greece (NBG), enabling thus 
farmers to use their crops as collateral. In this way, the NGB located a “safe” sector 
in which to place its capital, protected from the competition of other commercial 
banks (Kostis, 1987:160). This resulted in the impressive increase in bank loans ex-
tended to agriculture by the NBG from 1915 to 1929 and by the Agricultural Bank 
(AGB) from 1930 to 1940.
4 The contribution of the cooperatives to the impressive 
extension of farm credit was definite, since agricultural credit rose from 4.8 percent 
of total credit in Greece in 1915 to 75 percent in 1929. Furthermore, the small farm-
ers became members in the cooperatives en masse, mainly to have access to 
inexpensive credit. They also realized that collective organization would lead to im-
proving their economic and social position. To quote a widely held view: “they did 
not have a great sense of solidarity or collective obligation but regarded the organiza-
tion as a new means of acquiring credit” (Mazower, 2002:164). 
An important factor in the nature of the agricultural cooperatives was the fact that 
their activity was limited to that of a lending agent. They played an intermediary role 
on behalf of the banks, denying themselves all possibility of autonomous develop-
ment. Three out of four cooperatives at the time were exclusively involved with 
credit. Furthermore, certain cooperatives used the title as a pretext, purely for the 
sake of facilitating the flow of capital to producers. This prevalent one-dimensional 
character of the cooperatives was not due only to their weakness in developing pro-
duction but was mainly the result of extensive intervention by the National Bank and 
the Greek government, which both attempted to take advantage of this fertile move-
ment and to confine it within their own strategies (Kapogiannis, 1999). 
The National Bank’s intervention came as a result of the new legislative frame-
work for issuing agricultural loans created mainly with the enactment of Law 
2184/1920 “Regarding Agricultural Collateral.” A basic change was brought about in 
the way credit was made available. The National Bank no longer issued loans to col-
lectivities but instead lent its money on a case-by-case basis, making each farmer 
personally responsible.
5 The introduction of this practice made it easier to by-pass 
the board of directors of the cooperatives and to deprive them of any decision-
making power, thereby weakening the sense of collective responsibility. This devel-
opment led to the deterioration of cooperative operations. The attempt of the 
government to control the cooperative movement was also strengthened by the en-
                                                        
4  Thus, whereas in l9l5 the total amount of agricultural loan revenue made available by the National 
Bank was 4,685,000 drachmas, by 1929 the figure had risen to 1,613,333,000 drachmas. In 1939 the 
amount lent by the Agricultural Bank was 4,316,400,000 drachmas. 
5  Klimis notes that “the National Bank of Greece is totally covered, because the cooperative’s role as 
lending agent has been changed from that of a responsible party to that of a mechanism performing only 
preparatory work […] leaving the National Bank solely responsible for decisions to extend credit to 
individual cooperative members” (Klimis, 2001:29).      Agricultural Cooperative Organizations in Greece  55 
 
actment of Legislative Decrees of 31/5/1919 and 28/11/1925 regarding the State Su-
pervision of cooperative organizations which increased the authority of the agents of 
external supervision and limited the corresponding authority of cooperative admini-
stration.
6 The result of this was a decline in activism in the cooperative movement, 
with credit-oriented cooperatives acquiring predominance at the expense of those of 
the “productive” type. In the 10-year period 1923-1933 the percentage of “credit” 
cooperatives rose from 70 to 82 percent of the total, with a corresponding decrease in 
the percentage of “productive” and “supply” cooperatives (Avdelidis, 1976:61). 
The foundation of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (AGB) in 1929 satisfied a 
long-standing demand of the rural population for the creation of a purely agricultural 
bank and gave hope for the development of a balanced relationship amongst banks, 
farmers and cooperatives. However, the relationship of the new bank with the coop-
eratives was actually not better than that of the cooperatives with the National Bank, 
as the close-dependence relationship remained equally strong. The Agricultural Bank 
would henceforth play a central role in cooperative operations “as a privileged part-
ner, creditor, controller, associate and advisor” (Petmezas 2002:236-237), a role of 
ever growing importance during the interwar period. The government’s and the 
Bank’s involvement in agricultural cooperative affairs intensified even more during 
the 1930s due to the policy of increased government intervention in the economy and 
particularly agriculture as a result of the worldwide economic recession. This inter-
vention took the form of autonomous agencies of intervention and regulation of 
production and marketing, and gradually developed a protection framework (Sakella-
ropoulos, 1992), which vastly influenced the development of both the agrarian 
economy and cooperatives.
7 The enactment of anti-democratic laws and decrees 
(such as Law 5289/1931) was a part of the political system’s general tendency to-
wards authoritarian methods of governing. In view of this situation, the cooperatives 
had no choice but to become a part of an organized State-corporatism, something 
which happened without delay in light of the climate devastating liberal democracies 
in the 1930s. 
Agricultural cooperatives in the post-war period (1945-2000) 
During the first post-war period (1945-1967) the agricultural sector continued having 
particular importance for the Greek economy. Being responsible for 86.4 percent of 
                                                        
6  It is obvious that the implementation of external – and specifically governmental – supervision, in 
violation of cooperative principles of self-government, was directly instrumental in the State’s acquiring 
dominant political power over the cooperatives, in effect becoming their custodian. 
7  Government intervention increased with the establishment of autonomous agencies, which were 
responsible for exportable agricultural products, as well as those for domestic consumption. They fo-
cused on the concentration of products, the absorption of agricultural surplus and the assurance of base 
prices. 56  V. Patronis and K. Mavreas 
 
the total exports in 1955 and 73 percent in l966, it constituted the basic source of 
foreign exchange of the country’s development effort at the time. At the same time, a 
large percentage of the population was in agriculture. In 1961 it reached 3,674,592 
(the country’s total population was 8,388,553), and during the same year the total 
number of working farms reached 1,139,379. However, during this same period there 
appears to be a continually increasing discrepancy between the rural and the bour-
geois sector of the economy because the Gross National Product increased at an 
annual rate of 7 percent, whereas the corresponding percentage in the agricultural 
sector increased only at a 3 percent annual rate. Furthermore, the share of the agricul-
tural production out of the Gross National Product decreased constantly in opposition 
to the ever increasing contribution of the processing sector due to the more rapid 
growth of the bourgeois sector. Likewise, the per capita income of the farmer was 
quite low in comparison to the overall total income and that of the mid-income 
groups. It is evident that priority was given to the development of the middle-class 
economy by the governments of the interwar period; in other wards, to industrializa-
tion and mainly to the creation of public utilities as a necessary support. Arguing that 
the country was lacking in wealth-producing capital, the government supported capi-
talistic development based on large sums of capital.
8 Public works were founded with 
foreign loans and domestic bank deposits while various institutional and economic 
measures were taken to boost industrial development to the disadvantage of the agri-
cultural sector. This restrictive policy and the drastic decrease in agricultural income 
resulted in the vast exodus of the rural population to large urban centers and abroad 
in order to ensure their survival. 
In view of this economic policy, which put agricultural development at a disad-
vantage, the cooperatives’ opportunities for action were clearly limited. During the 
post-war period, the number of cooperative organizations greatly increased to include 
the large majority of rural households. Through these organizations the government 
channeled the funds necessary for production in the form of loans and materials (fer-
tilizer, tools, supplies, etc.). However, the Ministry of Agriculture’s and the AGB’s 
centralization, together with the Greek bureaucracy made it difficult for the coopera-
tives to improve financially, giving them little opportunity for productivity. 
Agricultural policies during the first post-war period (1945-1967) consisted of sys-
tematic state intervention by various agencies of centralization and management of 
domestic products (Sakellaropoulos, 1992). 
Also, most of these quasi-governmental agencies were reorganized after the war 
into consortiums in which the cooperatives participated. The above associations, 
consortiums and individual organizations of particular products “contributed to a 
multi-dimensional institutional, productive and industrial development in the agricul-
tural sector in the very first post-war years” (Kolymvas et al., 2001:34). At the same 
                                                        
8  Greece was not an exception in this area. It is well-known that common elements of all the stabiliza-
tion programs throughout all of post-war Europe were wage controls, the stimulation of production and 
investment incentives for those with investment capabilities.      Agricultural Cooperative Organizations in Greece  57 
 
time, however, it should be emphasized that these agencies were to a large extent 
controlled by the government (through the Agricultural Bank) and its economic pol-
icy, being state-financed. Their strong dependence on the government restricted these 
agencies in many cases into mechanisms of implementing official agricultural policy 
(Sakellaropoulos, 1991). A corresponding development also appeared with regard to 
agricultural products and industries. With the help of the Agricultural Bank, post-war 
cooperatives “acquired their own installations, established processing factories, im-
ported machinery and created a broad framework of technological modernization and 
production facilities” (Kolymvas et al., 2001:34). These investments were largely 
controlled by the Agricultural Bank,
9 a fact which increased State intervention in 
agrarian economy. 
In summary, with regard to the presence and operation of Greek agricultural co-
operatives during the post-war period (1945-1967), we would particularly like to 
stress the fact that the economic policy’s main priority of developing the bourgeois 
sector of the economy created many difficulties for agricultural cooperative devel-
opment. Further difficulties were created by the internal operations of the 
cooperatives (the majority vote system, voting through representatives, and the ex-
clusion of elected officials from party membership), which resulted in the continual 
re-election of the same leadership and a passive farm population, which sought al-
most exclusively only to improve its economic situation “through personal and 
professional connections” (Legg, 1969:122). Even more so, the political conse-
quences of the civil war, such as the constant states of emergency and the semi-
parliamentarian regime
10 imposed on the country, only created obstacles for the 
agents of social economy such as the cooperatives. 
The fall of the seven-year dictatorial regime (1974) upset political and social bal-
ances and signaled extensive reorganization in the agricultural cooperative sector, 
which sought its place in the new order of things created by the post-civil war gov-
ernment. New social conditions arose in rural Greece by the “new politicization of 
the agricultural sector” (Marantzidis, 1995) within an ever changing political scene 
revolving around the system of “bureaucratic patronage” (Louloudis and Maraveyas, 
2000), as well as a revival of public debate over questions of agricultural policy and 
development. The first-tier cooperatives increased in number, grouping together with 
other agricultural organizations to emerge as vehicles for agricultural claims as well 
as focal points for political discussion and party debate. 
The first serious point of conflict among the political parties occurred with the 
enactment of Law 921/79 by the Conservatives, which attempted to provide a ration-
ale for the cooperative movement in view of the upcoming membership in the 
                                                        
9  According to Mavrogordatos (1988:63) , “[…] the government owned Agricultural Bank not only 
supplied the cooperatives with vital supplies and credit (mostly subsidies) on behalf of each government, 
but also possessed most of the stocks (40%-85%) in so-called cooperative enterprises”. 
10   “A regime in which the right to vote was universal but at the same time was accompanied by sys-
tematic class exclusion” (Mouzelis, 1978:269). 58  V. Patronis and K. Mavreas 
 
European Community. Although Law 921/79 in theory intended to modernize coop-
erative organizations, in practice it appeared to reproduce the old status quo. 
Preserving the majority vote system ensured the leadership of the large farming in-
dustry “establishment” in the cooperatives, while a series of regulations increased the 
cooperatives’ dependence on the State. After the Socialist Party’s (Pan-Hellenic So-
cialist Movement – PASOK) rise to power, Law 921/79 was replaced by a series of 
Laws passed through l982-1985, which intended to regulate ab initio the relation of 
the State to the cooperative organizations. In 1982, Law 1257 was enacted with the 
ambiguous title “The Restoration of Democratic Order to Cooperative Organiza-
tions”.
11 In l983, Law 1361 was enacted with regard to cooperative organizations
12 and, 
in 1985, Law 1541 provoked intense reactions.
13 
The main objective of the new legal framework was to abolish the old rules of the 
electoral game played by the cooperatives (which, for whole decades, ensured the 
election of more or less the same traditional cooperative leadership) and to replace 
them with political party competition based on decentralized corporatism (Kioukias, 
1994:122-123). This new field of “opposition” was of course favorable to PASOK 
and the left-wing parties which had a tradition of active membership and, therefore, 
could easily prevail over the ideologically and organizationally unprepared conserva-
tive party. 
Finally, the result of the intervention in the Greek cooperative movement was far 
from the expectations of those who inspired it. It was, in fact, quite poor. The struc-
tural and operational weaknesses of the cooperatives (dependence on the State, 
ambiguity of their economic and social role and limited production) remained un-
changed. On the contrary, emphasis was given to the trade union type of control of 
the organization, a fact that intensified party infiltration and antagonism amongst 
them. In this way, the agricultural cooperatives were gradually transformed into 
“messengers” of the political parties and their leaders, who, in turn, proposed candi-
dates “whose main required qualifications were party devotion and performance and 
not knowledge, ability or experience in cooperative affairs […] and who considered 
                                                        
11  This law abolished the old provisions favoring continual re-election of the same cooperative leader-
ship, that is to say: multiple votes, voting via representatives and the simple majority electoral system. In 
their place the principle of “one man, one vote” was adopted, irrespective of the number of shares held in 
the cooperative. The proportional electoral system was also adopted and certain cooperatives were ex-
cluded whose demands were not deemed representative of the “true” farmer. So as to speed up 
unconditional compliance with these regulations, provisions were made for the dissolution of every 
cooperative organization which did not bring its by-laws into conformity with them within three months. 
12  Agricultural cooperatives were given financial assistance and accorded the right to determine what 
qualified as strictly agricultural and so entitled to receive benefits. In accordance with the provisions of 
this law, agricultural associations were classified as quasi-public decentralized entitities, like coopera-
tives and local government bodies. 
13  The controversial provisions were those that established proportional voting and the lists of candi-
dates of the different political groups and imposed one cooperative per geographical unit. Finally, 
because of the intense objections from the opposition party and many cooperatives, Law 1541 was modi-
fied in l986 and 1987. In practice, however, it was never applied.      Agricultural Cooperative Organizations in Greece  59 
 
the cooperative ranks as the first step in their political career, […]” (Papageorgiou, 
1998:43-44). Even more, their great dependence on and involvement with the State 
undermined their independence and led them to make unwise investment and produc-
tion choices (Klimis, 1985). 
Also, in the period after 1981, the cooperatives undertook an active role in the 
gathering and storage of farm products on behalf of the State and the Agricultural 
Bank. In fact, when the farmers were not satisfied with the prices that they were of-
fered, the government urged the cooperatives to pay higher prices, while deficits 
were temporarily covered by loans from the Agricultural Bank, usually without writ-
ten agreements and with doubtful practices lacking accountability and control. Thus, 
cooperatives were prompted to engage in financial activities, which surpassed their 
capabilities and finally led to their being overextended, while, in reality, they became 
agents of the government’s social policy. 
Furthermore, the cooperatives took serious risks in investments of doubtful out-
come, mainly in trade and processing of agricultural products. This was done at a 
time when corresponding private agricultural enterprises avoided such investments 
because of the related low margin of profit. Finally, these investments were planned by 
elected leaders that lacked the necessary professional credentials and were carried 
out without being based on feasibility and viability studies. Another factor leading to 
their failure was the lack of competitive, productive units within the agricultural sector. 
As a result of this unsuccessful policy, from 1985 onwards, cooperative-debt rose 
to dangerous levels and after 1989 it reached uncontrollable levels which threatened 
the very existence of many organizations.
14 In fact, competitive enterprises with 
years of operation in the agricultural sector incurred enormous damage, which not 
only destroyed their position in the market place, but also deprived them of the pos-
sibility to obtain credit. Even greater damage was caused by the prevalent 
perceptions that the cooperatives were just a sector of a wider government mecha-
nism, which would be able to solve all their problems, regardless of the demands and 
fluctuations of the market. Thus, the cooperatives lost the ability to engage in profit-
able enterprise and their image was reduced to that of a quasi public service, 
synonymous with suspect transactions, economic failure and debt. 
Concluding remarks 
In comparison with other European countries and the Balkans, there was a long delay 
in the appearance of agricultural cooperatives in Greece. The reason for this delay 
can be attributed to national, social, economic and political factors, but even more so 
to a non-existent agricultural movement, at least until the 1930s, as well as the major 
                                                        
14  Attempts to regulate cooperative debt in the 1990s were made in a climate of intense pressure and 
reactions from both sides and provoked the most heated conflict between the cooperatives and private 
organizations which had become active in the agricultural sector. 60  V. Patronis and K. Mavreas 
 
delay in the completion of agricultural reforms. During the 19
th and the first decades 
of the 20
th century the question of the distribution of land to smallholders and rural 
workers overshadowed all others. The fact that Greek agricultural cooperatives were 
initially established and supported, not by the farmers themselves but by the govern-
ment, has several implications. Firstly, during the interwar period cooperatives 
constituted the principal mechanism for channeling bank loans to farmers. They also 
served as a checking force concerning usury in rural areas. However, at that time, 
they occupied a privileged position as the object of intervention and the exercise of 
political power by the State and the banks. In fact, this intervention policy was inten-
sified during the 1930s, due to the national and international environment. 
Although agricultural cooperatives increased in number and membership after 
World War II, their role did not change. They continued to serve as a conduit for 
government funding; in other words, their policies continued to be closely dependent 
on the State and the banking system. Various problems relating to their internal struc-
ture, their direct connection to political parties after 1974 and unwise business 
practices simply magnified this dependence. The latter, especially, during the last 
two decades, created huge debts in the cooperatives which led either to their ruin or 
to their direct dependence on the State, which was called upon to cover their debts. 
An invisible thread characteristically connected the Greek agricultural cooperatives 
to the State almost from their foundation. Their integration during the interwar period 
into an organized State corporatism, their separation from civil society and their 
transformation into a branch of the central powers comprised the most important 
factors preventing Greek agricultural cooperatives from developing an autonomous, 
productive framework and condemning them to play a marginal, intermediary role. 
After one century of presence and operation within the Greek society, the agricul-
tural cooperative movement appears to have exhausted its ability to develop and to 
have incurred a persistent crisis. Instability in the structural and legislative frame-
work, the lack of accountability, strong dependence on and involvement with the 
government, its practice of social policy, unwise investments, over-lending and its 
resultant poor reputation, comprise the questionable image characterizing this agent 
of social and economic policy in rural Greece. Since there were no strategies aimed 
at unification or mergers in the past, Greece, in the eyes of the European Union, is 
presented as the country with the most cooperatives and the least membership. 
Their weakness in encouraging production has placed them in an intermediary 
role between the banks and the farmers. Furthermore, their contribution to an in-
crease in income for their members can only be deemed unsatisfactory, while their 
share in agricultural production has reached its lowest level in the post-war period. 
Consequently, not only their organizational autonomy but also their commercial 
credibility were shaken. This was beneficial to their competitors who believed they 
would be displaced because of the prevailing policies.      Agricultural Cooperative Organizations in Greece  61 
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